Religious pluralism, as I understand it, argues that the plurality of religions in the world represent the different ways in which "the All" or "the One" or what have you (the ultimate, hidden spiritual reality) has revealed itself to human beings.
I think that a decent objection to this kind of religious pluralism comes from the exclusivity claims made by nearly every world religion (some forms of Hinduism are an exception). If "the All" has revealed itself differently to some set of cultures, and if any revelation includes an exclusivity claim, then we must say that "the All" is being quite inconsistent, even dishonest. The inconsistency can be remedied if we become polytheists, in which case all our religions would seem to be the revelation of a plurality entities that are either daemonic or confused. Of course, if that constitutes "the All," then where did these entities originate? Not only is this a highly unpleasant solution since it admits of dishonesty or confusion, but it also raises a much bigger ontological problem. Besides, it seems to me that a religious pluralist would very much prefer "the All" to be a unity, for to do otherwise would be to admit that fundamentally all religions are quite different, depending on their particular source of revelation from within "the All," which would itself be pluralistic. Again, polytheism solves nothing and creates new problems.
So we are back to accounting for a plurality of religions with exclusivity claims from a unified source. It could be that "the All" is confused or dishonest, though a unity, but if we want "the All" to be anything like a mature concept of God, then this is absolutely precluded. Further, if "the All" is dishonest or incompetent, why should religion be a concern at all? Except for fear of this excessively powerful villain or imbecile (imbecilic villain?), there is no apparent reason to honor any expression of devotion to any god, spirit, &c. If indeed it is important to the advocates of religious pluralism to respect the diversity of beliefs in the world, this is not the way to do it.
Having dealt with some concepts of "the All" as being in some way or other inferior, let us ask ourselves whether a concept of "the All" more akin to traditional monotheism will work. In this case, God, bearing all his superlative attributes, including omniscience and omnibenevolence, has revealed countless falsities to different people groups. For any two exclusivity claims are necessarily contradictory. So a mature monotheism is incompatible with this type of religious pluralism. Suppose, however, that the inconsistent elements like the exclusivity claims were not revealed, but rather found their way in via misinterpretation of the true revelation. Aside from the touch of ad hoc-ness about it and complete lack of historical basis (how can we tell genuine revelation from misinterpretation), the misinterpretation solution simply fails once again to solve the fundamental problem. If the pluralist wants to preserve the integrity of different religions, he or she cannot do so when so many essential claims made by one religion are in radical opposition to claims made by another. The differences that are supposed to be valued on this view turn out to be errors on a grand scale. Exclusivity, after all, is essential to Christianity, as it is to Islam, as it is to Judaism, &c.
The only alternative that I can see standing is some form of pantheism. "God or Nature," as Spinoza put it in his famed identity statement. In this case the revelation is nature itself, being God, and so a variety of interpretation is to be expected. Indeed, this is even suggested by referring to the source of revelation as "the All." In one form, pantheism can say that the only revelation God is offering is general revelation, since by revealing Nature God reveals itself as it is. This is problematic, however, since so much content in the world's religions comes from claims of special revelation that in no way depend on nature. So the pluralist must either abandon respect for those parts of the worlds religions, thereby abandoning respect for most parts of the world's religions, or the pluralist must allow for "the (pantheistic) All" to make special revelations. Say, by making the claim that Nature has one universal consciousness in which all human beings participate, from which spiritual insights are drawn. This, however, falls into the same problems as the non-pantheistic possibilities do, as does any form of special revelation on pluralism. Spiritualizing nature does nothing to advance the pluralist case.
I can only reach one conclusion. In an effort to take all beliefs seriously, religious pluralists wind up with a vaguely spiritual, intellectually vapid existentialism that ends up taking no beliefs seriously.
24 February 2010
07 February 2010
Disputation on the Hidden Castle
From the BBC (Scroll down for the Disputation):
A farmer who built a castle hidden behind a stack of straw bales has lost a High Court bid to save it from being demolished.
Robert Fidler, of Salfords, Surrey, built the home - complete with turrets - without planning permission.
He kept it hidden until August 2006 but was ordered to tear it down by Reigate and Banstead Borough Council in 2008.
Mr Fidler appealed on the basis that his house had stood for four years without anyone objecting to it.
After the hearing, Mr Fidler pledged to take his fight to the European Court of Human Rights if necessary.
He said: "This house will never be knocked down. This is a beautiful house that has been lovingly created. I will do whatever it takes to keep it."
Immunity rule
When Mr Fidler removed the bales he believed the structure would no longer be subject to planning enforcement because of a legal loophole.
But in March 2007 the borough council issued an enforcement notice, which was upheld by a Government planning inspector in May 2008.
The inspector ruled that the removal of the straw bales constituted part of the building works and the four-year immunity rule would not apply.
The High Court was asked to decide whether the removal of the straw bales and tarpaulin was, in the eyes of the law, part of the building operation.
Deputy High Court judge Sir Thayne Forbes said: "In my view, the inspector's findings of fact make it abundantly clear that the erection/removal of the straw bales was an integral - indeed an essential - fundamentally related part of the building operations that were intended to deceive the local planning authority and to achieve by deception lawful status for a dwelling built in breach of planning control."
The judge said Mr Fidler had used two grain silos to form two turrets at the corners of his house. There was also "a stain-glass lantern feature" over a central hall, or gallery.
The property includes a kitchen, living room, study, shower room and toilet and separate WC.
On the first floor, there are four bedrooms and another room still being fitted as a bathroom.
Appeal planned
On the south side of the house there is a gravelled forecourt, and to the north and north-western corner a new patio and conservatory.
The judge said: "Mr Fidler made it quite clear that the construction of his house was undertaken in a clandestine fashion, using a shield of straw bales around it and tarpaulins or plastic sheeting over the top in order to hide its presence during construction.
Story from BBC NEWS:"He stated that he knew he had to deceive the council of its existence until a period of four years from substantial completion and occupation had occurred as they would not grant planning permission for its construction.
"I accept that the act of concealment does not in itself provide a legitimate basis for the council to succeed, as hiding something does not take away lawful rights that may accrue due to the passage of time."
He added: "From his own evidence and submissions it was always his intention to remove the bales once he thought that lawfulness had been secured."
After the hearing Mr Fidler's solicitor, Pritpal Singh Swarn, said an appeal was being considered.
He said: "Mr Fidler is obviously disappointed and will almost certainly want to appeal bearing in mind what he stands to lose, which is the house that he has built.
"The judge appears to have left open the big question - when is a building substantially complete?
"It is necessary for the courts to draw the line as to what constitutes a completed development."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/england/surrey/8495412.stm
Published: 2010/02/03 19:14:21 GMT
© BBC MMX
Disputation: Whether the Castle is substantially complete?
Obj. 1 It seems that the castle was not substantially complete before the removal of the haystacks, for the thing with the haystacks was of a different substance than the thing without the haystacks; therefore, the thing was not substantially a building before they were removed.
Obj. 2 Further, it is essential to the nature of a building to be seen; however, this building was not seen; therefore the thing was not a substantially complete building before the obfuscating haystacks were removed.
Obj. 3 Further, as St. Thomas Aquinas says (STQ75a2), a thing may subsist simpliciter, or it may subsist complete in its specific nature. The thing under construction is not complete in its specific nature, but it subsists, but not as a building, as a severed hand subsists but not as a human being. Therefore, the thing is not substantially complete.
Obj. 4 Further, if substance admits of degree, then at all stages of construction, the building is in part actually a building and in part potentially a building. Now, that which has an imperfection is in potentiality with respect to its perfection, which is actual. The haystacks, which obfuscated the thing, were imperfections; therefore, the thing was not actually and fully a building until the removal of those haystacks.
On the contrary, the Bard says, “Hang out our banners on the outward walls; / The cry is still, ‘They come:’ our castle’s strength / Will laugh a siege to scorn: here let them lie / Till famine and the ague eat them up” (Macbeth V.V).
I answer that, if the lawgivers grasp the meaning of a thing’s being "substantially complete," then it has to mean that the entity in question is a building in substance. Now, substance is "being." A substance that is a building has the essence (or quiddity, form, proper set of differentiae, etc.) to be (substantially, essentially, formally, actually, etc.) a building. Therefore, when the thing bears all the attributes essential to being a building, with any number of accidental attributes of whatever perfection besides, then it is formally and thus actually a building in substance. That is, if the thing bears all differentiae (e.g., walls, etc.) proper to its species (e.g., building) and genera (e.g., dwelling, etc.), even granted the presence of obfuscating haystacks, then it must be a building in substance. This is so. Clearly, since the haystacks and obfuscation were accidental to the substance, the substance was complete in the nature of being a building, and therefore was substantially complete, having actualized fully the form of a building. QED, all good Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophers ought to agree that it is right and just to let this man live in his castle.
Reply Obj. 1 and Obj. 2 Neither bales of hay nor obfuscation have anything to do with being a building essentially, but only accidentally, unless the definition of a building is to be amended with such a negative property as, "is not obscured." Negative properties, it is widely agreed among the Metaphysicians, cannot be essential to a thing. Even if they could, it remains to be proved why such a property should be amended to "building." It is simply mistaken to say that in order to be a building in order to be seen, for it is easy to imagine a building which is invisible and unseen, but which exists and is a building in substance.
Reply Obj. 3 Insofar as the thing under construction is not a substantial building, surely the completed thing is a building in essence. For as it has been shewn above (Reply Obj. 1 and Obj. 2), the thing, even while obscured by haystacks lacked nothing essential to its being a building in substance. For though the thing, while truly under construction, lacked the substance of a building according to the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor, but having fully attained those essential attributes of a building at completion and prior to the removal of the obfuscating haystacks, was substantially a building at that time, for obfuscating haystacks are merely accidental attributes.
Reply Obj. 4 Substance may admit of degree, but imperfections of accident in no way impede on imperfections of essence. The imperfections of the obfuscating haystacks are imperfections with respect to accident, as stated above (I answer that) and therefore have no bearing on the essence of the building, which in its complete state is perfect and therefore fully actual with respect to its essence.
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