Comments on Historiography and Psychology

The following is rather out of context and assumes some out-of-the-ordinary background knowledge. It is a short comment for discussion and most my reply to a response to it. Citations come from Goldman, Alvin. Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford, New York: 2006.

Part I

Historical investigation does much to highlight the utility of a hybrid Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory. In particular, history lends itself to a hybrid view wherein TT and ST are related by cooperation. Alvin Goldman delineates two types of cooperation: “First, theory may be used to select pretend inputs” (44) and second there is the “generate-and-test strategy, by which prior mental states are simulated to explain some posterior mental state (45). Given some historical event depicted in some non-empty set of sources and involving some non-empty set of agents, the fullest understanding is best explained by way of both TT and ST. The historian has not only the broad detached perspective to consider, but also the perspectives of all the agents involved, not least those that might have provided primary sources. This point is all the more important if the event in question takes place In a context substantially different from the historian’s own. In this case, theory is indispensible for the selection of pretend inputs, for it is theory that defines the broad perspective and context of the event. So, supposing the historian is writing of the Inca, much theoretical knowledge is required before that historian can start considering the plurality of individual perspectives on the event in question, which is plausibly accounted for by simulation. To do otherwise would be to eschew good, scientific historical methodology. So, because it is in principle possible and desirable to historicize about, on the one hand, the circumstances and decisions of Lincoln, and, on the other hand, the psychological, emotional, &c. factors behind them, cooperation is a good view for the historian to take. The latter point is especially well taken in the case biography as well as literary craft in the composition of an engaging historical account. Of course, all simulation lends itself to the dangers associated with projection, not least the “curse of knowledge” (41), which could very easily lead to inappropriately teleological readings that tacitly grant, for example, future knowledge to historical personages.

As for the generate-and-test strategy, there is an historical application to be noted. Namely, it is appropriate when asking questions like, “Why did Peter write a memoir emphasizing x, y, and z,” or, “Why did Paul write this letter with this content?” And of course, theoretical knowledge ought to guide the selection of which simulation explanation is chosen as the most plausible account.

Thus, cooperation is an attractive view for an historian to take, and so we can follow Collingwood’s apparent endorsement of simulation (18) and the very obvious fact that historians need theoretical consideration.

Part II

Now, I would like to add what is probably my strongest reason for backing the use of simulation in historical writing is its strength in source criticism (which is not to say all source criticism). There are some sources, such as letters, diaries, memoirs, and the like which tend to be highly personal in nature, such that a failure to sympathize would be to sacrifice the fullest possible interpretation. In making this point, I assume that simulation the way to do this, in a way that theorizing cannot.

By way of illustration, a number of years ago I read Maynard Solomon's biography of Beethoven, which gives an overtly Freudian interpretation to the composer's motives, behavior, &c. So when Solomon provides a lengthy analysis of Beethoven's "Immortal Beloved" letter, it is mired in Freudian analysis, at the expense of credence. So we can do one of four things as historians: adopt a better formal psychological theory, turn to the folk psychology of TT, simulate, or banish psychological considerations from historical inquiry. If we allow for a thorough optimism, a formal psychological theory might one day come to the rescue. I am not so optimistic, and I am even less inclined to say that such a formal theory could be appropriately employed for historical writing at present. Such an historian would be rightly shunned. Since I am inclined to think that a hybrid view is good for history, I want to dismiss neither TT nor simulation. Since it isn't terribly difficult to insist on theory in history, I simply have to assert that some use of simulation is warranted, as I think it is in reading the "Immortal Beloved" letter. As to the final option, I wholeheartedly agree that psychological speculation is to be limited (which is a large part of the problem I have with Solomon), and indeed can be eliminated from some kinds of historical writing, but for other kinds, such as those that are improved by speculations on subjects like "why did Beethoven write the 'Immortal Beloved' letter." For so long as the speculation (even of the simulationist sort) is limited by the sources, all will be well.